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During the last years we have witnessed more and more fears that the 
nation state and its ability to set demanding standards in fields like envi-
ronmental policy has diminished in the context of globalisation. There is, 
on the other hand, the hopeful prognosis of neo-classical economists 
that the same globalisation would be connected with deregulation and 
fundamental reduction of the role of government. Neither the fear nor the 
hope of a withering away of the nation state in times of globalisation are 
supported by empirical research. States in concert have expanded and 
co-ordinated their regulatory powers. And it is only the nation state, the 
guarantor of diverse societal interests, that has the competence, the re-
sources, the power and legitimacy to regulate the actions of disparate 
actors who might otherwise destroy shared environmental resources. 
There is a remarkable potential at least in the advanced OECD countries 
to promote change by the adoption of a pioneering policy, the stimulation 
of international competition and the diffusion of best practice. This poten-
tial of the highly advanced countries may be seen as a moral obligation 
to assume a higher responsibility for the global environmental develop-
ment. The advanced nations cannot hide behind the fictive monster of 
globalisation, seemingly legitimising any kind of inactivity. On the con-
trary, it is their obligation to provide the world with better “demonstration 
effects”, with a better model of production and consumption overcoming 
the resource and environment intensive model of the past. 
 

 I have used the concept of Ecological Mod-
ernisation since 20 years. The core of this 
concept is an environmental policy ap-
proach strongly relying on the logic of inno-
vation and its diffusion in market econo-
mies. Such an innovation-oriented environ-
mental policy is by its very nature a national 
pioneer policy.  
But what are the conditions of first-mover-
policies in environment? Is the nation-state 
still able to implement a demanding envi-
ronmental policy in times of globalisation?   
During the last years we have witnessed 
more and more fears that the ability of the 
nation-state to set ambitious standards in 
fields like environmental policy has dimin-
ished in the context of globalisation. There 
is also, on the other hand, the hopeful prog-
nosis of neo-classical economists that the 
same globalisation would be connected with 
deregulation and fundamental reduction of 
the role of government. Neither the fear nor 
the hope of a withering away of the nation 
state in times of globalisation are supported 
by empirical research. But the subject is still 
highly relevant, since the debate has taught 
us a lot on the role of the nation state in the 
context of globalisation. 
I would like to present ten theses regarding 
the role of the nation state in global envi-
ronmental policy. My basis are mainly 
cross-national studies, partly made by the 
Environmental Policy Research Unit of the 
Free University of Berlin. 
1 Globalisation has created a policy arena for pioneer countries, at least 
in environmental policy.  
Pioneering environmental policy of certain 
(highly developed) countries has always 
been possible since 1970. The influence of 
small innovative countries in global policy 
has never before been as important as to-
day in the field of environmental policy (An-
dersen/Liefferink 1997, Jänicke/Weidner 
1997, Jänicke/Jacob 2001, Andersson / Mol 
2002). This means that political competition 
and pioneer roles of countries have become 
relevant. But political competition needs an 
arena. The international system and espe-
cially the globalisation of environmental pol-
icy has created this policy arena. The Jo-
hannesburg Summit may be taken as an 
example. Here the situation has improved 
since the end of the cold war (and its di-
chotomic policy arena). International institu-
tions like the OECD or the UNEP, but also 
global networks of all kinds provide a basis 
for benchmarking and competition in global 
environmental policy. The hard core is regu-
latory competition giving support to domes-
tic innovative industries or protecting the na-
tional regulatory culture against pressures 
to adapt to policy innovation from abroad. 
This countervailing mechanism against the 
neglect of environmental considerations in 
the global economy may be not strong 
enough, but it can be improved. 
2 The nation state is both, the subject and object of global 
environmental policy learning and lesson-drawing 
The national government is the subject of 
policy learning on how to solve environ-
mental problems. At the same time national 
governments are looking for best practice, 
observing other governments (Rose 1993, 
Bennett 1991, Kern et al. 2001). Successful 
environmental policy innovations – the in-
troduction of new institutions, instruments, 
or strategies – thereby are often adopted by 
other governments. This improvement by 
imitation can be conceived as horizontal 
policy learning. It is an important mecha-
nism of global environmental policy devel-
opment and policy convergence. Interna-
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tional institutions such as the OECD, UNEP 
or special regimes play an important role as 
policy arenas for pioneers and as agents for 
the diffusion of environmental policy innova-
tions. This role seems to be more important 
than the creation of policy innovations by 
the international institutions themselves. 
Figure 1 shows some examples of the diffu-
sion of environmental policy innovations - 
such as environmental ministries or green 
plans - from pioneer countries to the rest of 
the world. The speed of diffusion has in-
creased in the 1990s, strongly supported by 
the Rio process. This may imply capacity 
building at the national level, even if the di-
vergence of capacities (behind the conver-
gent policy patterns) remains remarkable. 
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3 Policies are differently affected by globalisation. 
The international pressure on wages, taxes 
on mobile sources and social security provi-
sions is a reality in times of globalisation 
(Scharpf 1998). Environmental, but also 
health or security standards have their own 
(e. g. WTO) rules and their own logic in in-
ternational regulatory competition. The rea-
sons why environmental policy is a particu-
lar case seem to be extremely important 
and need special explanation: 
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4 There is no “race to the bottom” in environmental policy – but why? 
Several empirical cross-national studies 
have rejected the RTB-hypothesis (see 
box). Many arguments are well-known today 
(Vogel 2001, Wheeler 2001, Drezner 2001):  
No international race to the bottom: 
• ”We find no race to the bottom...countries with more open trade regimes have more strin-
gent regulations” (Eliste/Fredricksson 1998).  
• National environmental pioneer policy can create “first-mover advantages” (Ashford 1979, 
Porter/van der Linde 1995, Wallace 1995) 
• Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Thailand ”are fast adopting industrial pollution control 
standards similar to those in developed countries” (Hettige et al. 1996). 
• Strict environmental policy is no strong incentive to de-locate ”dirty industries” into devel-
oping countries with re-imports into rich countries (Jaffe et al. 1995, Jänicke et al. 1997) 
 
Countries and companies that trade with 
countries with strict regulations tend to have 
stricter policies themselves (Eliste/ 
Fredricksson 1998, Foljanty-Jost 1997) - the 
largest markets are rather strictly regulated. 
The globalisation of environmental policy 
has partly changed the framework condi-
tions of the world market (Jänicke/Weidner 
1997, Weidner/Jänicke 2002, Vogel 2001). 
Regulatory competition in environment often 
creates first-mover advantages for national 
economies. This is part of the global compe-
tition (Porter / v. d. Linde 1995, Wallace 
1995) and essential to the development of 
“environmental lead markets” (Jänicke/ 
Jacob 2001). Strict environmental regula-
tions (within limits) remain a possibility to 
protect national industries. Multinationals 
tend to use the same standards everywhere 
(Wheeler 2000). Differences in environ-
mental standards tend to decrease; gener-
ally they are less important than differences 
e.g. in labour costs or taxes. 
I would like to add two arguments: 
• The environmental issue has become a 
dimension of general technological pro-
gress. 40% of the innovations in 2010 are 
supposed to be relevant for environ-
mental improvement (Faucheux 2000). 
• The environmental issue has become im-
portant in the international competition for 
innovation - there is a close correlation 
between strict environmental regulation 
and competitiveness. 
5 Pioneer countries in environmental policy are highly competitive. 
The Global Competitive Report shows a 
remarkable high correlation (R2 = 0.89) be-
tween ambitious environmental policy and 
the competitiveness of a country (Global 
Competitiveness Report 2000). Other stud-
ies have revealed a similar relationship 
(Sturm et al. 2000). Of course, this is no 
causal proof. The causal relation can go in 
both directions; also third factors (e.g. the 
GNP per cap.) may be important. But in the 
light of such a correlation nobody can longer 
insist on the traditional economic argument 
of an immanent contradiction between com-
petitiveness and a demanding environ-
mental policy. The strong correlation of the 
“third factor” GNP can be explained by the 
formula: Highly developed countries are 
characterised by both, high perceived envi-
ronmental pressure and high capacity to re-
act.  
4 Martin Jänicke 
6 The open (“globalised”) national  economy needs and is  
characterised by strong government, both in size and scope. 
This is contrary to the thinking of many neo-
classic economists. There are cross-
national studies showing that public expen-
ditures in open economies in the OECD 
tend to be relatively higher (see: Cameron 
1978, Garret 1998, Bernauer 2000). But it 
seems plausible to assume both, a larger 
size and a larger scope of government ac-
tivities in countries being highly integrated 
into the international economy. Open 
economies need  
• a well developed infrastructure for suc-
cessful international competition, that 
means more money and more public ac-
tivities in fields such as education, R&D 
or transport. 
• the compensation of distributional and 
other effects of rapid structural changes 
connected e.g. with a low degree of pro-
tection of domestic industries. 
• more regulatory activities of all kinds nec-
essary to adapt to international develop-
ments (e.g. standards).  
7 New technologies as a rule start from national “lead markets”.  
The ecological modernisation of the world 
market depends on national lead markets 
for environmental innovations (Jänicke/ 
Jacob 2001, Beise 2001). A lead market is 
„the core of the world market where the lo-
cal users are early adopters of an innova-
tion on an international scale” (Beise, 1999: 
4). The U.S. as lead market for the internet, 
Japan as lead market for fax, or Finland as 
lead market for mobile phones are well-
known examples. Empirically, lead markets 
are characterized by e.g. high per-capita in-
come, demanding, innovative buyers, high 
quality standards and pressure for change 
(see also F. Meyer-Krahmer, 2000). 
Lead markets for environmental technolo-
gies, however, are characterised by two ad-
ditional factors. 1. They are typically not 
only stimulated by higher environmental 
preferences of consumers in that country, 
but also by special promotion measures, or 
by political intervention in the market. 2. A 
lead market for environmental innovations 
relates to global environmental needs and is 
– due to market failures - strongly depend-
ent on government support, sometimes also 
on support from NGOs such as Greenpeace 
or the media.  
Here again the role of the highly developed 
nation state and of pioneer countries is cru-
cial: The global economy and its multina-
tional enterprises are still in need of loca-
tions where the risky take-off of a new envi-
ronmental technology finds public support 
and innovative buyers who are willing to pay 
a higher price and accept the teething prob-
lems of that technology before it becomes 
cheap and effective enough to succeed on 
global markets. The regulators in Denmark 
and Germany created favourable market 
conditions and the customers of electricity in 
both countries were willing to bear the high 
price for wind power technology until it be-
came competitive and profitable on the 
global market. 
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8 Environmental policy innovation as well as regression are caused 
primarily at the national level 
In an expert inquiry for 20 different countries 
of the world we asked the participants: What 
are the main restrictive sectors in environ-
mental protection? The answer was: First 
the energy sector, second road traffic, third 
agriculture, fourth the construction sector 
(Jänicke/Weidner 1997). These are actually 
sectors that are not under hard global com-
petition, partly even the contrary is true (ag-
riculture, the power industry, the construc-
tion industry strongly depend on public or 
regulated demand). A lot of times it is again 
the nation state who resists international 
regulation: Countries such as the US, Ja-
pan, the UK or, more recently, Denmark are 
examples of the double option of either be-
ing innovator or laggard in environmental 
policy. 
9 The nation state will remain the “local hero”, not least in the field of 
environmental protection. 
There is no functional equivalent to national 
governments as highly visible, legitimised 
and competent territorial actors and protec-
tors (Willke 1992). To whom could we ad-
dress our complaints on environmental dis-
ruptions or issues such as BSE if not to this 
actor? Governments, on the other hand, 
have no exit option. They need both a mate-
rial and political base. They do not react to 
economic pressure alone. The legitimation 
they need necessitates a broader orienta-
tion. The environment is an aspect that 
cannot be ignored. Therefore national gov-
ernments try to seek compromises between 
the economy and the ecology. The answer 
is technology. As far as technology can pro-
vide solutions for environmental problems 
(in many fields we need more far-reaching 
“structural” solutions), the potential of na-
tional policy action is higher than generally 
assumed. This solution, however, is essen-
tially restricted not only by the general 
availability of technology, but also to the 
more advanced countries. 
THE NATION STATE AS “LOCAL HERO” 
• High visibility, “first address” in case of complaints 
• Highest competence, also as actor in the global arena 
• Monopoly of coercive power 
• Financial resources 
• High pressure for legitimation (compared to other levels)  
M. Jänicke / FFU 2002 
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10 Global environmental governance strongly depends on both the com-
petence and creativity of national governments and the international 
system as a complex mechanism of policy diffusion and coordination. 
Of course this (“horizontal”) view on the role 
of national governments is no alternative to 
the (“vertical”) view on international institu-
tions. The more interesting question is 
whether international regulation or the com-
petitive role of pioneer countries represents 
the main motor of global environmental pol-
icy development. At the Johannesburg 
Summit the EU (strongly influenced by the 
German government), for the first time, has 
gone beyond the minimalist global consen-
sus by stressing its pioneer role. Together 
with a large group of about 125 countries it 
is going to follow an ambitious policy to 
support renewable energies.    
 
Two Approaches to Global Environmental Policy 
• Consensus: “Governance by international regulations” 
(e.g. Kyoto protocol) 
- International institutions, negotiations and regulations  
- and their effects on national policies   
- Global consensus, often on a low level 
- “vertical” perspective  
• Competition: “Governance by national pioneer policy” 
(e.g. obligatory feed-in tariffs; Alliance for renewable energies) 
- Influence of pioneer countries in terms of policy diffusion  
- Demonstration effects of policy innovations and best practice   
- Pressure by political and technological competition 
- “Horizontal” policy learning and lesson-drawing 
Jänicke/FFU 2000/2 
 
This paper has underlined the role of the 
pioneers, of innovation and diffusion. We 
need a lot more research on the role of (dif-
ferent) national policies as well as on the 
mechanism of political competition in the 
global arena to provide an answer to the 
question. But even if the competitive pres-
sure (both in policy and technology) caused 
by pioneers in environmental policy would 
prove to be the most forceful driving force, 
the international institutions would play an 
important role as policy arenas and as 
agents of diffusion. 
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Conclusions 
This short paper is not be misunderstood as 
an optimistic picture of globalisation. In 
general, we are not very successful in the 
field of environmental protection. The global 
economic development increases, both at 
the same time, the level of environmental 
pressure (e. g. in the field of transport) and 
the capacity to react to environmental prob-
lems. The race between those two tenden-
cies may not be won by environmental pol-
icy. The question is, however, whether 
globalisation is the main problem. 
In sum, neither the increased importance of 
global markets nor the globalisation of po-
litical governance have weakened the role 
of national governments. “...the economic 
dimensions of globalisation have had little, if 
any, impact on lowering national regulatory 
standards, while the social and political di-
mensions of globalisation have, on balance, 
contributed to the strengthening of national 
regulatory standards” (David Vogel, 2001). 
“States in concert” have expanded and co-
ordinated their regulatory powers. And it is 
only the state, the guarantor of diverse so-
cietal interests, that has the competence, 
the resources, the coercive power and le-
gitimacy “to regulate the actions of disparate 
actors who, in their pursuit of individual 
gain, might otherwise destroy shared envi-
ronmental resources” (Raustiala, 1997).  
One important reservation, however, needs 
to be made: It is the highly developed nation 
state which has preserved or even in-
creased his capacity in the context of glob-
alisation. The situation of the less devel-
oped countries may be viewed quite differ-
ently. 
Keeping this in mind, we could draw two po-
litical and normative conclusions from the 
above ten statements: 
First, there is a remarkable potential in the 
advanced OECD countries to promote 
change by the adoption of a pioneering pol-
icy, the stimulation of international competi-
tion and the diffusion of best practice. This 
may sometimes be more helpful than relying 
only on weak and/or on weakly imple-
mented treaties (such as the Kyoto proto-
col). Secondly, this potential of the highly 
advanced countries may be seen as a moral 
argument to assume a higher responsibility 
for the global environmental development. 
The advanced nations cannot not hide be-
hind the fictive monster of globalisation, 
seemingly legitimising any kind of inactivity. 
On the contrary, it is their obligation to pro-
vide the world with better “demonstration ef-
fects”, with a better model of production and 
consumption overcoming the resource and 
environment intensive model of the past. 
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